Authoritarian states are often a vulnerable target of naming and shaming for their rights abuses and atrocities. I show that China can shield itself from severe criticisms in the UN human rights system. How do material incentives from China affect the leniency of peer reviews of its human rights conditions? I argue that trading for lenient reviews is possible, but its effectiveness depends on how reviewing states prioritize economic benefit over normative principles. Using text-based coding of over 90,000 UN Universal Periodic Review recommendations, I demonstrate that countries with strong economic ties through Chinese overseas development projects offer more lenient reviews of China’s human rights records. This effect, however, is conditional on a state’s normative alignment with China. I find that while close countries are already disposed toward leniency and distant countries remain normatively resistant, “middle” countries whose stance on human rights norms is neither too aligned with nor too distant from China’s are most sensitive to influence. Contrary to the conventional belief that the U.N. human rights regime is deeply politicized, I highlight material interests do not always override liberal values, and great powers face limits when attempting to buy diplomatic support among those consistently uphold divergent normative positions.

The meteoric rise of China represents a seismic shift in International Relations. With a focus on human rights, we examine this shift’s implications for the international institutional order—does China challenge, undermine, and replace rules and institutions that an earlier and much weaker China did not fully participate in making? Using the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR) as a laboratory, we analyze more than 93,000 recommendations made between 2008 and 2021. We highlight the multidimensionality of international human rights norms and provide new and systematic evidence that China, like most other countries, endorses some norms more than others. China increasingly champions economic and social rights; its position is shared by many countries, particularly in the Global South, which argue these rights deserve priority relative to civil and political rights.

Citation: Dai, Xinyuan, and Lucie Lu. 2025. “Beyond Liberal Narratives: China and the International Human Rights Order.” International Affairs 101(2): 459–482.

Global human rights governance in the United Nations is institutionally bifurcated between Geneva-based review mechanisms and New York–based legislative arenas. This paper bridges the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to develop a novel framework for identifying states’ underlying normative commitments. We introduce Norm Consistency, defined as the cross-institutional and longitudinal alignment between a state’s rhetorical priorities in Geneva and its legislative sponsorship behavior in New York. Leveraging over 90,000 UPR recommendations (2006–2021) and comprehensive UNGA resolution sponsorship data, we show that high norm consistency predicts norm entrepreneurship and network centrality, while low norm consistency signals transactional vulnerability to material incentives. These patterns cut across regime type, advancing new insights into norm contestation and politicization in global human rights governance.

While existing research has demonstrated the role of material power in influencing state behavior, the precise costs of buying favors and the boundaries of this power are under-explored. This study investigates the effectiveness and limitations of economic statecraft in shaping normative discourse within international organizations. Specifically, when does Chinese foreign aid help silence sensitive critiques of China’s human rights practices? Analyzing the Universal Periodic Review data, with a particular focus on middle- and low-income countries’ human rights reviews to China over time, we find that the financial thresholds of aid flow required to diminish vocal criticism of China’s civil and political rights are unexpectedly high. For countries receiving lower levels of aid, we observe a counterproductive effect, where increased assistance is associated with greater vocal criticism rather than silence. Our findings reveal the material resources provided by China are insufficient to completely mute vocal critics. We challenge the assumed material power driving states’ behavior, and argue for a more nuanced understanding of the limits of economic statecraft in shaping normative discourse.

Over recent decades, developing countries have witnessed a rapid surge in internet connectivity, driven by an upswing in aid projects dedicated to information and communication technology (ICT) development. While many expect the increased internet connectivity to contribute to the freedom of expression and freer flow of information, others worry that it would rather enable recipient governments to expand their information control and digital surveillance. How do communication aid projects affect internet freedom in recipient countries? Through a cross-national analysis of aid and internet freedom in developing countries, our research reveals that the effect of communication aid on internet freedom varies by the sources of aid projects. Specifically, Chinese aid geared toward communication development has a negative relationship with internet freedom in recipient countries. Conversely, communication aid projects funded by the World Bank and the United States do not exhibit a similarly negative correlation. This paper also finds that the negative association between Chinese communication aid projects and internet freedom is more pronounced in autocratic recipient countries.

Citation: Yang, Y., Lu, L., Williams, M. et al. Connect First, then Suppress: Chinese vs. Western Communication Development Projects and Internet Freedom. Studies in Comparative International Development (2025).

Why has China significantly increased its overseas renewable energy development projects in the absence of strong environmental pressure from recipient countries or binding in- ternational obligations? We argue that the turn toward renewable energy in China’s overseas initiatives is a positive spillover from its domestic environmental reforms in the early 2010s, marked by the tightening of financial regulations. These industrial reforms pushed Chinese firms to develop technological expertise and operational ca- pacity in renewables, granting them a comparative advantage in global green markets and contributing to a surge in overseas green infrastructure. Tracking energy types in data on construction- and energy-related Chinese development projects from 2000 to 2021, we show that a notable increase in renewable energy investments after China’s 2012 green policy shifts, predating its formal international green pledges under the Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, these renewable projects are disproportionately located in countries with stronger climate ambitions, as reflected in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. Our findings suggest that China’s global leadership in green energy is driven less by international environ- mental norms than by its domestic political economy, offering a durable foundation for international environmental engagement rooted in national policy transformation.

China has become the leading financier of renewable energy, yet where Chinese firms pilot experimental green projects remains under-explored. We challenge the view that Chinese SOEs simply “follow the flag” to diplomatic allies by proposing a dual-logic framework in which firms balance political mandates with market constraints. We argue that diplomatic alignment matters only when operational risks are manageable, and that regulatory openness and diplomatic ties jointly shape overseas investment strategies. Using our original CORE (Capital Openness in the Regulation of Energy) dataset (2000–2025), we show strong sectoral divergence. In friendly and open markets, firms invest across both green and brown energy. In hostile but open markets, firms strategically pivot to green technology as a low-sensitivity entry point. In contrast, in friendly but frictional markets, firms abandon experimental green projects in favor of high-rent brown extraction. These findings demonstrate that Chinese state capital is not purely state-directed: SOEs strategically assess regulatory risk before acting on diplomatic signals. More broadly, we show how regulatory environments condition the deployment of authoritarian capital and the diffusion of green technology.

China invests heavily in overseas energy development, yet local responses vary widely. I argue that public sentiment depends less on investment volume than on how host-state regulations structure Chinese firms’ roles (Builder vs. Owner) and project sectors (Green vs. Brown energy). Using original data from the CORE (Capital Openness in the Regulation of Energy) dataset, merged with geocoded Chinese projects and Afrobarometer surveys, I show a “Regulatory Paradox”: where firms are restricted to visible contracting roles, local sentiment is most positive—especially in green energy. In contrast, when Chinese firms hold ownership and operational control, public sentiment declines, particularly in brown energy projects. These findings demonstrate that host-state regulatory authority is a central filter shaping the political economy of development and foreign influence.

Absent formal avenues of transparency, how does China publicize its foreign aid and debt allocation efforts? We examine the role of Chinese state-sponsored media and diplomacy as complements to Chinese foreign aid. We use AidData’s Chinese development finance dataset and its recently released diplomacy dataset, along with meta-data from millions of Xinhua news articles between 2002 and 2017. We find that China likes to publicize its role as donor, but seeks closer ties with its debtors.

Citation: Lu, L. and Williams, M. (2025), Attention Versus Handshakes: Pathways of Influence in China’s Foreign Aid and Loans. Journal of International Development, 37: 655-674.

Soft propaganda is often considered a residual category encompassing all forms of propaganda that do not fall under the category of hard propaganda. Soft propaganda tends to be more entertaining, emotionally captivating, and potentially more credible. Moreover, soft propaganda utilizes various media genres that effectively engage audiences in the digital age. There are two types of soft propaganda with the intent to shape people’s minds: first, purely entertaining and non-political forms may influence citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors by increasing their media brand loyalty and attention capture. Second, political information is packaged entertainingly to convey pro-regime messages and evoke nationalist sentiments. This approach can be particularly effective in today’s media era. Nonetheless, the key challenge in studying the effectiveness of soft propaganda lies in defining and understanding the intricacies of this elusive concept.

Citation: Lu. Soft Propaganda, in Nai, A., Grömping, M., & Wirz, D. (Eds.). (2025). Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Communication. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Conventional wisdom holds that American public opinion on foreign policy is elite-driven and less polarized than domestic issues. Yet in a deeply polarized political environment, this assumption may no longer hold. Because public views of China appear to align with a bipartisan “China threat” narrative, the China case offers a valuable test of whether foreign policy attitudes remain stable across time and issue domains. Drawing on repeated cross-sectional survey experiments conducted during the Trump and Biden administrations, we expose respondents to subtle cues referencing global economic development, democratic backsliding, and security threats. While baseline attitudes toward China appear stable over time, we find that responsiveness to issue-specific frames is fluid. These treatment effects likely correspond to changes in how particular issues are emphasized in elite discourse surrounding China. We also uncover surprising partisan divergence: Republicans respond more positively to messages about China’s economic development, whereas Democrats are more concerned with China’s role in democratic decline and international security. We suggest that even in ostensibly bipartisan domains, public opinion is responsive to minimal cues. Foreign policy issues can be increasingly subject to polarization than previously believed.

How does a rising power like China craft its public diplomacy messaging strategy? While existing research has focused heavily on the “Wolf Warrior” narrative, often treating it as a singular, unified voice of Chinese diplomacy, this paper reveals substantial variation in how individual Chinese embassies engage with foreign publics. Departing from the prevailing structural explanations that emphasize geopolitical alignment or regime type, we highlight the role of individual diplomats. We argue that ambassadors’ personal characteristics significantly shape the tone, narrative, and thematic content of state messaging on digital platforms. To test this argument, we construct two novel datasets on China’s public diplomacy via X (formerly Twitter). The first includes over 342,000 posts from 145 Chinese embassies between 2014 and 2023, representing the most comprehensive dataset of embassy-level messaging to date. Using human annotation and machine learning, we classify the thematic focus, narrative stance, and affective tone of these posts. The second dataset compiles biographical profiles of Chinese ambassadors, detailing their educational backgrounds, career trajectories, and political connections to top Chinese Communist Party leadership. Linking ambassador profiles to embassy messaging strategies, this study uncovers the microfoundations of authoritarian public diplomacy and sheds light on the personalization of China’s global influence operations in the digital age.

Autocrats have always sought to win the hearts and minds of their citizens, but whether they are more capable of achieving this goal through direct interactions with citizens on social media is an open question. This study examines the communication strategies of Chinese state-run media on social media regarding international news. I draw on observational data from Weibo, to reveal how state-run media engage with international news. Their engagement manifests in two modes, neutrally or sensationally. The more neutral and moderate approach adopted by state-run media in their narratives is likely to elicit positive evaluations of the host government or exacerbate negative perceptions of the foreign country’s situation, particularly in the case of the U.S. This paper demonstrates how the nuanced media strategies employed by state-run media in engaging the online public on social media can engender greater public support for the government than previously assumed.

Academic conferences ideally promote positive environments that make scholars from underrepresented groups feel welcome. Yet negative experiences at conferences continue. Codes of conduct have been promoted as tools to reduce harassment and discrimination. We examine the prevalence and content of codes at U.S.-based political science conferences and workshops. More specifically, we analyze how codes address issues of sexual misconduct and identity-based discrimination. We find that 19% of surveyed conferences have codes. Many of the codes are what we deem to be “symbolic.” We argue that effective conference codes must contain clear definitions, clear reporting channels, and clear enforcement procedures.

Citation:Lu L, Webb Williams N. Codes of Conduct at Political Science Conferences: Prevalence and Content. PS: Political Science & Politics. 2024;57(4):563-570.

In the liberal-based international human rights regime, authoritarian states are often a robust target of “naming and shaming” due to their rights abuses and atrocities. Is China an exception to this trend? If so, why? Considering the different approaches to human rights between the United States and China, which country’s vision resonates more with the Global South? This paper illustrates that China is not as vulnerable in the UN-based multilateral human rights regime as might be expected. Instead, it actively contests and shapes international human rights norms to gain more followers aligning with its development-oriented human rights framework. Many Global South countries, regardless of regime type, largely resonate with China’s vision, prioritizing economic and social rights over civil and political freedoms. However, a subset of states do resist China’s economic influence and maintain a commitment to liberal human rights principles. This paper suggests the U.S. should seriously evaluate how human rights norms are articulated within the Global South and use economic leverage to reverse the erosion of liberal norms. Rejoining the UN Human Rights Council would be a crucial first step in counterbalancing China’s growing influence and reasserting moral leadership in the global human rights discourse.